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The Commission’s new SGEI package: the rules for sta e aid and the compensation 




Abstract:  In December 2011 the European Commission updated its or ginal SGEI 
package of 2005 in which it spelled out under which onditions public service 
compensation constituted aid but was compatible with the internal market. As such both 
versions of the Package complement the 2003 Altmark ruling of the European Court of 
Justice which outlined the four conditions under which compensation would not be 
considered to form aid in the first place. The new r gime seeks to distinguish on the one 
hand generally compatible social services (such as e lthcare and social housing) and on 
the other the utilities where individual exemption decisions are believed to be more 
frequently required. Compared to the 2005 version there is now also more emphasis on 
efficiency and the use of public procurement procedur s and more detail on what 
constitutes acceptable costs and a reasonable rate of return. 
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The 2003 ruling of the ECJ in the Altmark Case meant a breakthrough in the treatment of 
services of general economic interest (SGEI) under th  state aid rules. The Commission 
built on this basis by means of a coherent package of measures adopted in 2005 under 
Article 106(3) TFEU which aimed to provide a framework for SGEI that did not meet all 
the Altmark criteria but were eligible for an article 106(2) TFEU exemption as aid that 
was compatible with the internal market. This package is known as the Altmark  package, 
or as the “Monti/Kroes package” after the Commissioners responsible. Based on the 
experience gained in the meantime and an extensive consultation the Commission 
proposed a renewed Altmark Package “Mark II” in September 2011. Following a further 
shorter consultation this was adopted with minor modifications on 20 December 2012 and 
came into force on 31 January 2012 (with exception of a de minimis Regulation that will 
be adopted in April 2012).1 In this contribution we will briefly touch on the Altmark Case 
and the first Altmark Package before discussing the Altmark Package Mark II and 
focusing on of the differences between the two as well as some points of criticism. 
 
SGEI 
First it is necessary to recap briefly the concept of SGEI. Such services can be designated 
by the Member States in accordance with subsidiarity, and in the absence of any limited 
list or definition provided at EU level. This notwihstanding in areas of EU harmonisation 
such as energy or electronic communications minimum sets of universal services are 
established at EU level that can form the basis of SGEI. A designation as SGEI is also 
subject to a test for manifest error. The Treaty rules for SGEI are found in Article 106(2) 
TFEU which provides for an exception to the Treaty rules for undertakings charged with 
providing SGEI in so far as these rules would obstruct the performance of the public 
service task involved. Article 14 TFEU (formerly Article 16 EC) and Protocol No. 26 that 
was added by the Lisbon Treaty also contain provisins that are relevant to SGEI, and 
were intended by the Member States to limit the Commission’s powers with respect to 
SGEI. Article 14 TFEU confers a legislative competence on the European Parliament and 
the Council (without prejudice to Articles 106 and 107 TFEU) that has so far not been 
used. The Protocol concerns the common values that are the subject of SGEI and services 
of general interest which (SGI), not being economic in nature, remain outside the scope of 
the Treaties. The more extensive secondary rules that exist for SGEI in the context of 
state aid are the subject of this  article. 
 
The Altmark case 
Altmark concerned the conditions for the award of a regional transport license in 
Germany.2 In this case the Court ruled that if the undertaking concerned provided a 
                                               
1 Commission Decision of 20.12.2011 on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union to State aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain 
undertakings entrusted with the operation of servics of general economic interest, OJ 2012, L7/3; 
Communication Commission European Union framework for State aid in the form of public service 
compensation, OJ 2012, C8/15; Communication from the Commission on the application of the European 
Union State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest 
Brussels, OJ 2012, C8/4. Draft Commission Regulation on the application of Articles 107 and 108 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid granted to undertakings providing 
services of general economic interest is, OJ 2012, C8/23. 
2 Case C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft 
Altmark GmbH, and Oberbundesanwalt beim Bundesverwaltungsgericht [2003] ECR I-7747. (Opinions by 
Advocate General Léger of 19 March 2002 and 14 January 2003). Cf. F. Louis and A. Vallery, “Ferring 
revisited: the Altmark Case and State financing of public service obligations”, (2004) World Comp. 53-74; 
A. Sinnaeve, “State financing of public services: the Court’s dilemma in the Altmark Case”, (2003) 3 
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universal service in exchange for its financing there could be no case of state aid because 
instead of economic advantage compensation as a quid pro quo for a service provided was 
at stake. Such economic advantage after all is a conditi n for a finding that aid exist – 
alongside the use of state resources, selectivity and n appreciable restriction of 
competition and of trade between the Member States. This ruling decided the 
longstanding debate whether in comparable cases compatible aid was at issue or not aid 
but compensation in favour of the latter approach.3  
 
In order to meet the Altmark conditions 
 
― first, the recipient undertaking is actually required to discharge public service 
obligations and those obligations have been clearly defined;  
 
― second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated have 
been established beforehand in an objective and trasparent manner;  
 
― third, the compensation does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of 
the costs incurred in discharging the public servic obligations, taking into 
account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those 
obligations;  
 
― fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is 
not chosen in a public procurement procedure, the lev l of compensation needed 
has been determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical 
undertaking, well run and adequately provided with the relevant means so as to be 
able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in 
discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a 
reasonable profit for discharging the obligations. 
 
In particular meeting the fourth condition raises difficulties in practice. In fact in most 
cases where appropriate public procurement procedures are followed the question is what 
the need for a SGEI would be in the first place. However this condition is generally seen 
as the most innovative because it means introducing an efficiency test.4 In order to 
provide a solution for those cases when not all four conditions are met the Commission 
adopted its original Altmark Package in 2005. It should be noted however that meanwhile 
the General Court has demonstrated in the 2008 BUPA Case that it is prepared to take a 
more relaxed attitude to in particular the third and the fourth Altmark conditions, which 
could call into question the Commission’s approach.5 
 
                                                                                                                                            
EStAL 351-364, M. Ronellenfitsch, “Das Altmark-Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs”, (2004) 
Verwaltungsarchiv 425-442; S. Bracq, “Droit communataire matériel et qualification juridique: le 
financement des obligations de service public au coeur de la tourmente”, (2004) RTDE 33-70. 
3 A compensation approach was first found in Case 240/83, Procureur de la République v Association de 
défense des brûleurs d'huiles usagées (ADBHU) [1985] ECR 531; Case C-53/00, Ferring SA v Agence 
centrale des organismes de sécurité sociale (ACOSS) [2001] ECR I-9067; a state aid approach in Case T-
106/95, Fédération française des sociétés d'assurances  (FFSA) et al. v Commission  [1997] ECR II-229; 
Case T-46/97, SIC - Sociedade Independente de Comunicação SA v Commission [2000] ECR II-2125; 
Case C-332/98, France v Commission (aid for the Coopérative d'Exportation du Livre Français) [2000] 
ECR I-4833. 
4 Cf. e.g. Services of General Economic Interest, Opinion Prepared by the State Aid Group of EAGCP 
(Economic advisors group for competition policy), June 29, 2006. 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/sgei.pdf 
5 Case T-289/03, British United Provident Association Ltd (BUPA) et al. v Commission [2008] ECR II-81. 
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The original Altmark Package 
Where not all four Altmark conditions are met (as mentioned generally the fourth or 
efficiency condition is problematic) there is aid that may however yet be declared 
compatible with the internal market based on the SGEI exception in Article 106(2) TFEU.  
It is its policy with regard to the application of Article 106(2) TFEU to such aid that the 
Commission clarified with the adoption of its 2005 Altmark Package, which consisted of 
a Decision and a Framework. In parallel the Commission also updated the Transparency 
Directive of 1980, thereby introducing the requirement of accounting separation for 
SGEI.6 The Commission adopted the package using its exclusive legislative powers based 
on Article 106(3) TFEU, which means that the European Parliament and the Council were 
consulted but did not have a formal vote in the decision making process. 
 
The Decision 
The Commission Decision was in practice a block exemption that created a safe harbour 
for aid to undertakings below a particular threshold as well as for particular economic 
sectors and exempts them from the notification and standstill obligations of Article 108(3) 
TFEU. Provided certain conditions (that are discussed below) were met the relevant aid 
was considered to be compatible with the internal mrket on the basis of Article 106(2) 
TFEU. 
 
This block exemption applied to undertakings with a turnover that was less than 100 
million € for the two preceding years and with respct to a maximum compensation of 30 
million €. In addition the exemption was applicable to both hospitals and undertakings in 
charge of social housing which were entrusted with SGEI irrespective of their turnover or 
the amount of compensation involved. (There were separate thresholds based on 
passenger numbers for air and maritime links, air- nd seaports which will not be 
discussed further.) 
 
In order to benefit from the exemption the undertaking concerned had to be entrusted with 
the operation of a SGEI by means of one or more official acts (the form of which may be 
determined by the Member State). These acts had to specify at least: 
― the nature and the duration of the public service obligations; 
― the undertaking and territory concerned; 
― the nature of any exclusive or special rights assigned to the undertaking; 
― the parameters for calculating, controlling and reviewing the compensation; 
― the arrangements for avoiding and repaying any overc mpensation. 
 
Moreover the Decision contained detailed requirements with respect to the compensation 
involved, which paid particular attention to cases where the undertaking entrusted with 
operating an SGEI is also engaged in other economic act vities. The costs to be taken into 
consideration involved the relevant variable costs and a proportionate contribution to 
fixed costs as well as a reasonable profit and any necessary infrastructural investment. In 
order to determine what constituted a “reasonable profit” the risk involved and the 
                                               
6 Commission Directive 2005/81/EC of 28 November 2005 amending Directive 80/723/EEC on the 
transparency of financial relations between Member States and public undertakings as well as on financial 
transparency within certain undertakings, OJ 2005, L312/47. Now Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of 
16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and public 
undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain undertakings OJ 2006 L318/17. (This 
replaced Commission Directive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 on the transparency of financial relations 
between Member States and public undertakings as well as on financial transparency within certain 
undertakings, OJ 1980 L195/35.) 
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average rate of return in the sector concerned weretaken into account, or if necessary that 
of a comparable undertaking in another sector and/or Member State. 
 
The Decision required accounting separation if an undertaking operating a SGEI also 
carried out other activities (without prejudice to the application of the Transparency 
Directive, see below). Finally, the Decision also included reporting obligations for the 
Member States on the implementation of its provision  that were intended to allow the 
Commission to determine whether the compensation gra ted was compatible although the 
data were delivered at an aggregate level (not by the individual undertakings concerned). 
 
The Framework 
The Framework applied to those cases that fell outside the scope of the Decision but its 
contents were highly similar as regards the need for a formal act containing the public 
service obligations and the method for calculating the compensation, the costs and 
revenue to take into account in doing so, the concept of reasonable profit, and with regard 
to overcompensation. In fact the Framework was intended primarily for large 
undertakings that can be found in the utilities sectors such as transport, electronic 
communications, posts, public broadcasting, energy, water and waste disposal which 
could not claim the safe harbour provided by the block exemption in the Decision but that 
were subjected to what are the same substantive norms, albeit on a case by case basis. In 
this context the Framework formed a type of guidance which made the outcome of 
individual state aid and SGEI cases more predictable. 
 
The Transparency Directive 
Although it is broader in scope (because it applies to public undertakings more generally) 
the amended Transparency Directive formed a potentially significant reinforcement of the 
Altmark Package. This amendment imposed accounting separation for their various 
activities on undertakings enjoying a special or exclusive rights granted by a Member 
State or is entrusted with the operation of a SGEI and that carry out other activities. This 
was necessary in order to be able to control for overcompensation. The obligation to keep 
separate accounts however only applies to undertakings with a turnover of 40 million € or 
more and in so far as the services concerned may have an effect on trade between the 
Member States. In addition and paradoxically, undertakings that were charged with 
providing an SGEI by means of a transparent and non-discriminatory procedure are 
exempt from this obligation. 
 
The review of the Altmark Package (Altmark Package Mark II) 
Between the two Altmark Packages the Commission had issued two biannual reports on 
social services of general interest7 as well as two documents with answers to frequently 
asked questions (FAQs).8 After having gained about five years of experience with the 
original Altmark Package and after the customary extensive consultation the Commission 
                                               
7 SEC(2008) 2179, Commission staff working document, Biannual Report on social services of general 
interest, Brussels 2.7.2008; SEC(2010) 1284 final, Commission services working document, Second 
Biannual Report on social services of general interest, Brussels 22.10.2010.  
8 SEC(2007) 1516, Commission staff working document, Frequently asked questions in relation with 
Commission Decision of 28 November 2005 on the application of Article 86(2) of the EC Treaty to State 
aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation 
of services of general economic interest, and of the Community Framework for State aid in the form of 
public service compensation, Brussels, 20.11.2007; SEC(2010) 1545 final, Commission staff working 
document, Guide to the application of European Union rules on state aid, public procurement and the 
internal market to services of general economic interest, and in particular to social services of general 
interest, Brussels, 7.12.2010. 
 6
presented its proposals for the review of the Altmark Package on 15 September 2011.9 
This was adopted with minor modifications on Decembr 20th 2011.10 The Altmark 
Package Mark II consist of four elements: (i) a Commission Communication; (ii) a 
revised version of the Decision; and (iii) of the Framework; as well as (iv) a new 
Regulation on de minimis aid. 
 
The Communication 
The purpose of the Communication is to explain the main concepts that are relevant to the 
application of the SGEI in the state aid context. The state aid rules only apply to the 
relationship between public authorities and undertakings, which are defined with 
reference to the following quote form the Pavlov Case in 2000 as “entities engaged in an 
economic activity, regardless of their legal status and the way in which they are 
financed”.11 This means it uses a functional definition where th  status of an entity under 
national law is not decisive. An economic activity consists of offering goods and/or 
services in a market: this allows a distinction to be made according to the way in which 
services are offered in a particular Member State at a given time. Hence the way a 
Member State organises an activity will co-determine whether the state aid rules apply. 
 
The Communication also deals with the concept of the exercise of public powers 
(activities that intrinsically form part of the prerogatives of official authority) and with the 
relevant criteria for the most contested “social” sectors such as social security,12 
healthcare and education. It is worth noting that with respect to these categories different 
checklists of criteria are used without reference to a hard core of common criteria in order 
to determine whether an activity is economic in nature of whether solidarity or public 
authority prevails. Hence it appears likely to make  difference which point of departure 
is chosen in a particular case. Next, the Communication deals with the other requirements 
for a finding of state aid such as advantages derived directly or directly from state 
intervention and an effect on trade. 
 
Finally the Communication elaborates on the conditions applied to decide when 
compensation for the performance of a public servic obligation constitutes just that, and 
not aid. This starts out from repeating the Altmark conditions and continues with the 
existence of a SGEI, the entrustment act, the parameters for compensation and the 
avoidance of overcompensation. To a large extent this repeats what we have discussed 
above with relation to the original Altmark package and the additional points which we 
will discuss below with regard to the new Decision and Framework. 
 
More important is the emphasis placed by the Communication on the fourth Altmark 
condition (the efficiency condition) with regard to the use of public procurement 
procedures. This link between aid, SGEI and public procurement had already been 
                                               
9 Cf COM(2011) 146 final, Commission Communication, Reform of the EU state aid rules on services of 
general economic interest, Brussels, 23.3.2011; SEC(2011) 397, Commission staff working document, 
Report on Application of EU State Aid rules on Services of General Economic Interest since 2005 and the 
Outcome of the Public Consultation, Brussels, 23.03.2 11 
10 Cf D. Géradin, “The New package in services of general economic interest”, (2012) Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 1-3; L. Gyselen, “Publivc service and EU competition law” (2011) Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice 572-577. 
11 Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98, Pavel Pavlov et al. v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten 
[2000] ECR I-6451, para 75. 
12 Cf. e.g. Case C-350/07, Kattner Stahlbau GmbH v Maschinenbau- und Metall- Berufsgenossenschaft 
[2009] ECR I-1513, para 66, where it is stated thatan insurance body is not an undertaking but fulfils an 
exclusively social function, “where such a body operat s within the framework of a scheme which applies 
the principle of solidarity and is subject to State supervision”.  
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emphasized by the Monti report on the internal market of 2010.13 In this context it is also 
relevant that even where there is no formal requirement to apply the public procurement 
rules the transparency case law of the Court applies, with similar substantive norms.14 The 
Communication spells out in detail how the procurement and transparency rules may be 
met in order to secure the selection of the tenderer capable of providing the services at 
“the least cost to the community”. 
 
In those cases where the public procurement rules have not been applied the amount of 
compensation must be based on generally accepted market remuneration or, in the 
absence of such a standard, the amount of compensation must be based on the analysis of 
the costs of a typical undertaking that is well runand adequately provided with material 
means, taking into account a reasonable profit. 
 
The effect on trade is now detailed as applicable “where markets have been opened to 
competition either by the Union of national legislation or de facto by economic 
development”.15 This may lead to problems especially where a decision to provide an 
SGEI other than through a public procurement procedure leads to market distortions such 
as preventing entry. In order to be classified as SGEIs services must be “addressed to 
citizens or be in the interest of society as a whole”.16 
 
In contrast to the draft of the Communication, the version adopted emphasizes the 
Commission will only test for a manifest error when checking whether a service can be 
provided by the market. The Framework specifies that t is is the case unless provisions of 
Union law provide a stricter standard.17 Instead of stating that it would not be possible to 
assign an SGEI where an activity is already provided or can be provided under market 
conditions, the Communication now states this would not be appropriate.18 This is in line 
with the observation therein that “What is not a market activity today may turn into one in 
the future, and vice versa.”19 Read jointly with the manifest error standard alredy 
mentioned this does not add up to a clear test. 
 
The Decision 
The proposal for a Decision contains two major changes with respect to the 2005 
Decision. In the first place this concerns the scope of the exemption. The general 
threshold will be lowered by half from 30 to 15 million € a year. This is motivated by the 
increasing role in providing SGEI of multinational providers.20 At the same time what can 
be called the “social exception” is extended considerably. Here it is stated that at the 
current state of development of the internal market a “larger amount of compensation for 
social services does (…) not necessarily produce a greater risk of distortions of 
                                               
13 A new strategy for the single market: at the service of Europe’s economy and society. Report to the 
President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, by Mario Monti, 9 May 2010 (especially 
point 3.3. Social services and the single market). 
14 Case C324/98, Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom Austria AG  [2000] ECR I-10745; 
Case C-231/03, Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v Comune di Cingia de' Botti [2005] ECR  I-7287; 
Case C-458/03, Parking Brixen GmbH v Gemeinde Brixen en Stadtwerke B ixen AG [2005] ECR I-8585. 
Cf. Commission interpretative communication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or 
not fully subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives, OJ 2006, C179/2. 
15 Communication, above note 1, para 37. 
16 Ibid., para 50. 
17 Framework, above note 1 para 13. 
18 Communication, above note 1, para 48. 
19 Ibid., para 12. 
20 Decision, above note 1, recital 10. 
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competition.”21 Apart from hospitals and undertakings in charge of s cial housing the 
exception now covers without threshold limits the following: 
 
(b) compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest by 
hospitals providing medical care, including, where applicable, emergency services 
(…) 
 
(c) compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest 
meeting essential social needs as regards health care, hildcare, access to the 
labour market, social housing and the care and social inclusion of vulnerable 
groups (…). 
 
This exemption also applies if the undertakings concer ed are involved in directly related 
ancillary activities.  
 
The second main change that is proposed concerns the concept of “reasonable profit”. 
This takes into account the risk depending on the sector concerned, the nature of the 
service and the characteristics of the compensation. In this context it is accepted that  the 
Member State promotes productive efficiency by allowing the undertaking to share in the 
gains – provided an equitable share goes to the benfit of the Member State and/or the 
users. A rate of return on capital (ROC) that does not exceed the relevant swap rate plus a 
premium of 100 basis points is regarded as reasonable. If the use of the ROC is not 
feasible its is acceptable to use other profit level indicators.22 
 
The obligation in the original Decision to keep separate accounts for SGEI is repeated. 
Also the entrustment and yearly amounts of compensation over 15 million € must be 
published for undertakings that engage in activities other than SGEI. The reporting 
obligations are retained and expanded – for instance the existence of third party 
complaints now has to be reported – but remain at an aggregate level (i.e. they are not 
specified by type of SGEI and/or undertaking). 
 
Finally the Decision spells out more clearly than its predecessor that efficiency gains that 
do not compromise the quality of the service rendere  and that are shared between the 
undertaking and the Member States and/or the users may be taken into account when 
determining what constitutes a reasonable profit. 
 
The Framework 
The proposal for a new Framework likewise contains a number of innovations. The 
proposal for the new Framework had assumed that where s rvices are already being 
provided, or can be provided, by undertakings in accordance with the rules of the market, 
and under conditions such as price and access to the service that are consistent with the 
public interest, they could no longer be defined as SGEI. However this has been toned 
down considerably. Similar to what is set out in the Communication the Framework now 
provides: 
 
(…) Member States cannot attach specific public servic  obligations to services 
that are already provided or can be provided satisfactorily and under conditions, 
such as price, objective quality characteristics, continuity and access to the 
                                               
21 Ibid., recital 11. 
22 Such as accounting measures including the average return on equity (ROE), the return on capital 
employed (ROCE), the return on assets (ROA) or the eturn on sales (ROS). 
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service, consistent with the public interest, as defined by the State, by 
undertakings operating under normal market conditions. As for the question of 
whether a service can be provided by the market, th Commission's assessment is 
limited to checking whether the Member State’s definition is vitiated by a 
manifest error, unless provisions of Union law provide a stricter standard.23 
 
In addition the new Framework requires Member States that wish to benefit from its 
provisions to conduct a public consultation to take the interest of users into account, i.e. to 
determine the nature of demand for the services concerned. 
 
The relationship with the public procurement rules that follows from the Altmark Case 
itself is strengthened in the new Framework by a provision that aid which is granted in 
violation of the procurement rules is considered to be contrary to the interest of the Union 
within the meaning of Article 106(2) TFEU. 
 
Like the new Decision, the new Framework too contains provisions that concern 
necessary costs and the reasonable profits that are included in them. In the new 
Framework however there is more emphasis on efficiency. On the one hand this means 
that where risk bearing activities are concerned th reasonable profit may reflect those, on 
the other hand that including efficiency incentives (or incentives to contain costs) in the 
compensation mechanism will now normally be required barring exceptional 
circumstances. It is not clear whether this emphasis on efficiency is fully covered by the 
Altmark case, while as mentioned the application of the Framework is likely to occur 
precisely in those cases where the conditions of the fourth Altmark condition have not 
been met. Whether the new Framework needs to be fully in line with Altmark on this 
point depends on the issue to what extent Article 106(2) TFEU itself is held to contain an 
efficiency requirement. 
 
Finally the Framework states that in a number of cases compensation can generate more 
serious distortions in the internal market. This concerns bundling SGEI tasks that could 
be allocated separately, connecting SGEI with special and exclusive rights, the financing 
of infrastructure that is not easily replicable and those cases where the entrustment of the 
SGEI hinders the effective enforcement of internal market legislation. As regards the 
provision of an SGEI without a competitive selection procedure in a non-reserved market 
which results in foreclosure the Commission may intervene: 
 
The Commission, while fully respecting the Member State's wide margin of 
discretion to define the SGEI, may (…) require amendments, for instance in the 
allocation of the aid, where it can reasonably show that it would be possible to 
provide the same SGEI at equivalent conditions for the users, in a less distortive 
manner and at lower cost for the State.24 
 
Where non-replicable infrastructure is involved an obligation to grant third party access to 
infrastructure on equitable terms may be imposed (such as already exists e.g. in the 
electronic communications and energy sectors based on sector-specific EU legislation). 
 
The Regulation 
Whereas the new Decision and the Framework both assume the existence of aid, which 
under certain conditions may be compatible with the int rnal market, the principle of the 
                                               
23 Framework, above note 1, para 13. 
24 Ibid., para 56. 
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Regulation is to create a de minimis rule with thres olds below which there is no aid. This 
means the conditions in Article 107(1) TFEU are not met and hence there is no obligation 
to notify nor to respect the standstill obligation. However the existence of an SGEI in the 
sense of Article 106(2) TFEU is a precondition for the application of the Regulation. 
 
In contrast to the new Decision and Framework which f nd their legal basis in Article 
106(3) TFEU, the legal basis for this de minimis Regulation for SGEI is Regulation (EC) 
994/98 which enables the Commission to set a threshold for measures that do not meet all 
the criteria of Article 107(1) TFEU.25 This means the SGEI Regulation is a lex specialis 
with regard to the general de minimis Regulation for state aid that has the same legal 
basis and determines that aid may not amount to mare than 200.000 € per undertaking 
over a three year period.26 
 
The Regulation applies a de minims regime to aid that amounts to less than 500.000 € 
over any period of three fiscal years. There is a long list of exceptions such as aid for 
fisheries and aquaculture, the coal industry, road tr nsport and aid granted to undertakings 
in difficulty that will not be examined further here. In addition there are monitoring 




Social SGEI versus utilities 
In broad strokes the Altmark Package Mark II is mainly a revamped version of the 
original Altmark Package. It is noteworthy that the Commission in its Altmark Package 
Mark II has attempted to create a clear division betwe n on the one hand social SGEI 
(sometimes confusingly called social services of general interest while it is their 
economic nature that makes them SGEI) under the new D cision and on the other hand 
the large providers of SGEI such as are seen in transport, electronic Communications, 
posts, energy, water and waste management under the new Framework. This is 
understandable as a device that enables the Commission to concentrate its limited 
resources on the most serious cases. The new focus on (or leniency toward) social 
services dates back not only to the Lisbon Agenda,27 but certainly also originates with the 
Services Directive, which could only be adopted in 2006 after healthcare, various social 
services and SGEI had been excluded from its scope.28 
 
In this context it is also worth noting that the General Court in its 2008 BUPA Case 
adopted a very pliant approach to especially the third and the fourth Altmark conditions.29 
It may be justified that the complex world of risk equalisation schemes where insurers 
have to collude at one level in order to compete more effectively on another is not judged 
by standards originally devised to meet the possibly more straightforward needs of local 
transport concessions. However this does raise questions regarding the limits of the 
                                               
25 Council Regulation (EC)  No 994/98 of 7 May 1998 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community to certain categori s of  horizontal state aid, OJ 1998, L142/1. 
26 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 of 15 Decemb r 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 
88 of the EC Treaty to de minimis aid, OJ 2006, L379/5. 
27 COM(2006) 177 final, Communication from the Commission, Implementing the Community Lisbon 
programme: Social services of general interest in the European Union {SEC(2006) 516}, Brussels, 
26.4.2006. 
28 Directive 2006/123/EG of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in 
the internal market, OJ 2006, L376/36. 
29 Case T-289/03, above note 4. 
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conditions set in the Altmark Case which after all form the foundations of both the 
original Altmark Package as well as the Altmark Package Mark II now under discussion. 
 
Enforcement 
The means for private enforcement of the state aid rules concerning SGEI appear to be 
limited. The Altmark conditions themselves can be applied by national courts in order to 
determine whether state aid is involved or not. Likewise the national courts can test to see 
whether the conditions of the block exemption Decision have been met. At the same time, 
although the reporting obligations are set at an aggregate level the obligation to keep 
separate accounting data under the Decision will lead to much more relevant information 
being accessible for individual cases. However once it is clear that not all relevant 
conditions are met the process stalls and intervention by the Commission becomes 
necessary in order to determine whether a case of exemptable aid is involved. A 
complaint to the Commission – which has now made its strategic priorities in the utilities 
sectors abundantly clear – will then be the only remedy, with generally a limited chance 
of success. 
 
In addition the formal emphasis on the entrustment act and the long list of items that have 
to be covered there stands in stark contrast to the Commission’s actual practice of 
deriving de nature and scope of the public service concerned from the context of laws and 
regulations at national level – never mind the parameters for compensation and the 
instruments for recovering overcompensation. See, for instance, the BUPA case. Or 
should we expect a different approach for healthcare and the social services covered by 
the new Decision? 
 
Conclusion 
Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No. 26 to the Treaties created the impression that the 
Commission would become less interventionist in its application of Article 106(2) TFEU. 
However with the Altmark Package Mark II the Commission is now continuing its 
tightening of controls on economically significant utility services while imposing a more 
relaxed regime on the politically sensitive sectors f social services and healthcare. The 
requirements for acceptable costs and reasonable profits are tightened and there is a 
concerted effort to impose efficiency incentives. There is also a recurring tandem between 
the state aid rules for SGEI and the public procurement rules – an area where further 
developments may well be expected. On balance this appears to be an advance in the 
sense of creating more  room for market-based solutions. The weak point of the Altmark 
Package Mark II is likely to be enforcement. Too much rides on the Commission services. 
This has always been the case for state aid and in the present context concerns in 
particular the services that will be covered by the new Decision. Against this background 
more active judicial review – even if limited to verification of the Altmark criteria as well 
as the requirements set for the block exemption – would be a welcome development. 
